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HERMENEUTICS—THE PATH OF THE
HERMENEUTIC-ONTOLOGICAL SHIFT
AND THE DECOLONIAL SHIFT
Celso Luiz Ludwig*
The purpose of the reflections that follow is to highlight the meaning and
importance of the hermeneutic shift produced by the work of Gadamer, to consider some of his themes and categories, and to extend the meaning of this
hermeneutic rationality to the legal field in terms of a new conception of interpretation. A second objective is to catch sight of new theoretical perspectives,
having as a starting point the unfolding of practical philosophy into hermeneutic philosophy carried out by Gadamer. This article aims at recuperating,
among other things, the fundamental hermeneutic problem, so as to obtain a
glimpse into the possibility of new theoretical prospects (just as Aristotle’s proposed division of philosophy into practical and theoretical generated new theoretical perspectives for Gadamer). However, this objective will not be
developed in-depth in its concepts and categories, but only suggested in the
final paragraph.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT
The philosophical context of the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg
Gadamer can be situated within what is called “linguistic turn.” The “turn” in
question can be understood as a paradigm change, as that term is articulated by
Thomas Kuhn. This paradigm change, which was welcomed by philosophy to
classify its own history, led to the paradigm of language in the second half of
the twentieth century, after going through the paradigm of the being (the ontological paradigm) and the paradigm of the subject (the paradigm of consciousness). In order to clarify the new hermeneutic rationality, the reference to the
shift of philosophy itself, in the sense of paradigm change, allows us to specify
its departing point—language. However, the linguistic shift serves to emphasize the multiplicity of its voices, not to reduce the amplitude of human rationality. Thus, the unfolding of the paradigm of language indicates the presence
of a typology that could be classified as follows: first, communicative rationality, as promoted by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas; second, systemic
rationality, as promoted by Niklas Luhmann; and third, hermeneutic rationality
as promoted by Heidegger, and especially by his student, Hans-Georg
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Professor Ludwig received his Bachelor’s Degree in Philosophy from the Pontifı́cia
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Gadamer. Considering this analytical framework, the theme of hermeneutics,
according to the current philosophical meaning, is situated in the context of the
linguistic pragmatic overturn of contemporary philosophy. It is according to
this premise and also in this paradigmatic context that we conceive the specific
Gadamerian hermeneutic rationality. We borrow from this theory to outline a
way to go beyond the horizon of epistemology.
We begin with a preliminary observation about the role of language in
philosophical production, considering the paradigmatic shift. It is important to
highlight that this “shift” of philosophy does not mean the inclusion of language as another relevant theme for philosophical reflection. It means that philosophy itself, or the way philosophy is understood, has undergone a change.
Language is placed in a new dimension, moving from the object of reflection to
the foundation of thinking. Philosophizing means philosophizing through language and within its limits. According to Karl-Otto Apel:
It might be possible to easily reach—among the ones who are knowledgeable about
philosophical literature—the consensus that in our century the occupation of the philosopher with his own conscience, something characteristic of the modern era, has
more recently given place to the occupation of the philosopher with language. This
seems to mean that the philosophy of language came to take the place of the traditional epistemology—the philosophy of language not as the thematization of the
object language among many other objects that can be known, but as reflection about
the linguistic conditions of cognition.1

This change in the attitude of the philosopher led Apel to understand that
this was a movement that went from cognitive critique, as an analysis of consciousness—the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness—to cognitive
critique as an analysis of language—the new linguistic paradigm. This shift of
philosophy led to speculation about the possibility of a new criterion of validation. The central point of the matter, according to Apel,
seems to be in the fact that the problem of validation of truth cannot be seen anymore
as a problem of evidence or certainty (“certitude”) for an isolated conscience in the
Cartesian sense, nor as a problem of objective validation (therefore, intersubjective)
for a “conscience in general” in the Kantian sense, but, in the first place, as a problem
of the intersubjective formation of consensus based on a mutual linguistic (argumentative) agreement.2

The displacement present here—of the evidence, or of the certainty of an
individual or general conscience for the linguistic agreement—shows that there
are two things at play. The first indicates that there is a rupture between modern philosophy and the philosophy produced from the second half of the twentieth century to the present: a shift from the certainty of cognition and cognition
as certainty to the idea of cognition as an argumentative consensus. The second
indicates that there is continuity, which is present in the reflection about the
conditions of possibility and validity of knowledge: before this was consciousness, today it is language.
It is productive to reflect on this constant movement between rupture and
continuity, between the consciousness paradigm and the language paradigm.
The Kantian matter of the possibility and validity of meaning is relevant, even
1
2

KARL-OTTO APEL, TRANSFORMAÇÃO
Id. at 354.

DA

FILOSOFIA 353-54 (Loyola 2000) (1973).
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currently, but in varied philosophical fronts that do not ignore this context.
There were many attempts to find an answer when there could be no univocal
answer. The linguistic-hermeneutic philosophy developed by Hans-Georg
Gadamer, working from Heidegger’s initiatives, is one of the answers that currently contributes substantially to a better understanding of the theme of
comprehension.
II. HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY
A. Hermeneutic and Critical Reason—the Practical Reason
In Hans-Georg Gadamer’s work, hermeneutic reason clarifies the relation
with critical reason.3 The debate between hermeneutic and critical reason
involves two contemporary German philosophers: Jürgen Habermas and HansGeorg Gadamer. Considering the controversy that unfolded in the 1960s and
1970s, this article will focus on the topic of the return of hermeneutic questions
to the center of the philosophical debate. Although hermeneutics has always
been an important subject in philosophy, in the last fifty years hermeneutics has
acquired new meaning and has become a vital topic of discussion. This
renewal of hermeneutics constitutes a change in the fundamental orientation of
hermeneutics from a special and occasional field (restricted to a theory about,
or the art of, interpretation) to the broader field of philosophy. It became the
core of philosophy in the sense of conceiving reason, before any other determination, as hermeneutic reason. It extended from special applications to philosophical problems in general. According to Gadamer, hermeneutics now holds
such importance that philosophy itself has become hermeneutics. The importance lies in the transformation of modern epistemic rationality into the current
conception of hermeneutic rationality.
In a text written by Gadamer in 1976, this register of a new hermeneutics
is clearly defined and adopted:
In itself hermeneutics is old. But in perhaps the last fifteen years it has taken on a
new relevance. If we wish to assess this relevance and clarify the significance of
hermeneutics and its relation to the central problems of philosophy and theology, we
need to work out the historical background in the context of which the hermeneutical
problem has taken on this fresh relevance. We have to trace the way hermeneutics
has expanded from a specialized and occasional field of application to the vast field
of philosophic questioning.4
3 For more on the famous Habermas-Gadamer debate regarding the respective roles of hermeneutics and critical theory, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, DIALÉTICA E HERMENÊUTICA [DIALECTIC AND HERMENEUTIC] (Ivaro Luiz Montenegro Valls trans., L & PM 1987); HANSGEORG GADAMER, A RAZÃO NA ÉPOCA DA CIÊNCIA [REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE]
(Ângela Dias trans.,Tempo Brasileiro 1983) (1981). The subject is also an object of reflection in the work of JOSÉ CARLOS MOREIRA DA SILVA FILHO, HERMENÊUTICA FILOSÓFICA E
DIREITO: O EXEMPLO PRIVILIEGIADO DA BOA-FÉ OBJETIVA NO DIREITO CONTRATUAL [Philosophical Hermeneutics and Law: The Privileged Example of Objective Good Faith in Contract Law] 74-81 (2d ed. 2006). In this work, the reader will find studies about the main
hermeneutic categories proposed by Gadamer.
4 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 88 (Frederick G. Lawrence
trans. 1981); GADAMER, supra note 3, at 57.
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This new status shows that reason—a central theme in the history of western philosophy—starts to be seen as a hermeneutic reason.5 It is through this
more comprehensive and less cognitive conception that Gadamer centers his
concept of reason as primarily hermeneutic, therefore establishing a difference
in relation to Habermas’s conception of reason, which is understood as critical
reason. This difference is emphasized in the way that reason comprehends its
possibilities, limits and critical power. In the end, the difference between the
two philosophers concerns a central matter: For Gadamer, defining reason as
hermeneutic means to understand it as practical reason.
B. Overcoming the Theory of Method
Comprehension moves beyond method. The philosopher builds a theory
of comprehension with the objective of showing that, contrary to what happens
in the discourse of modern rationality, hermeneutic inquiry is not a matter of
method. In the very beginning of his work, Gadamer argues that, “The hermeneutic phenomenon is basically not a problem of method at all.”6 With this
statement he shows that he is not interested in developing a theory of the art of
interpretation, as if he were merely advancing some steps on a field that had
already been explored. His theory breaks up with the theoretical-instrumental
meaning of production of knowledge. His concern is comprehension itself.
The question he asks is directly related to the phenomenon of comprehension:
How is comprehension possible?7 He makes clear that his objective is not to
develop or describe a system of rules that serves as a guide for the methodological procedure of human sciences. His focus is the philosophical character of
understanding and not an effort to define the procedure to use in understanding.
He explores the condition of the possibility of comprehension and thereby
investigates what happens with us “beyond” our “wanting” and “doing” when
we understand something. According to Gadamer: “It is not as much what we
do, but what happens to us above our wanting and willing.”8
Indeed, the issue is not what we should do, in the philosophical sense of
asking for rules to follow. That would be a matter of method. Gadamer’s
philosophical reflection is directed to what is common to every form of understanding. He concludes that comprehension is not a subjective behavior about
a given object; it belongs to the being that is able to be understood. For this
reason, “[T]he hermeneutic problem is basically not a problem of method at
all”;9 rather, it is a theory of understanding that conceives of reason as something prior to method.
5 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 306 (2d ed. Continuum 2004) (1960) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH]; HANS-GEORG GADAMER & FLÁVIO PAULO MEURER, VERDADE E
MÉTODO I: TRAÇOS FUNDAMENTAIS DE UMA HERMENÊUTICA FILOSÓFICA [TRUTH AND
METHOD I: FUNDAMENTAL TRAITS OF A PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS] 459 (Flávio Paulo
Meurer trans., 3d ed. Petrópolis 1997) (1960) [hereinafter GADAMER, VERDADE].
6 GADAMER, TRUTH, supra note 5 at xx; GADAMER, VERDADE, supra note 5, at 31.
7 GADAMER, VERDADE, supra note 5, at 16.
8 1 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HERMENÊUTICA EM RETROSPECTIVA: HEIDEGGER EM RETROSPECTIVA [HERMENEUTICS IN RETROSPECT: HEIDEGGER IN RETROSPECT] 115 (Marco Antônio
Casanova trans., 2d ed., Petrópolis 2007) (1995) [hereinafter GADAMER, RETROSPECT 1].
9 GADAMER, TRUTH, supra note 5, at xx-xiv; GADAMER, VERDADE, supra note 5, at 31-36.
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Thus, Gadamer deconstructs the assumption that following a method is the
certain way to achieve and legitimate truth. When comparing method and dialectic, Richard Palmer reveals differences that call our attention for the effects
of both. He shows how Gadamerian reflection conceives the relation of the
subject with the method:
In method, the theme to be investigated guides, controls and manipulates; in dialectics it is the theme that raises the issues that will be answered. The answer can only
be given if it belongs to the theme and is situated in it. The interpretative situation is
not anymore the situation of a person who questions and the situation of an object,
considering that the one who questions should “build” methods that make the object
accessible, on the contrary, the one who questions finds that she is the one being
questioned by the theme (Sache). In such situation “the schema subject-object” is
misleading because the subject becomes the object.10

According to this conception, understanding asserts itself as a process of
self-understanding as it inserts the subject in the object. Therefore, it surpasses
the view of the subject as being the one who can access the object through a
method.
C. The Importance of “Prejudice” as Pre-judgment
Gadamer advocates the idea that pre-judgments have a special importance
for interpretation. He indicates that pre-judgments are an unavoidable consequence of the historical nature of the human person. Consequently, prejudices
are not merely judgments, something that one can accept or reject. They are
the basis upon which one may understand. Prejudices—pre-judgments—constitute the condition of possibility of all comprehension: they are the presuppositions. The conception of science reduced to method is positivist.
Gadamer, however, looks behind this later methodological approach to investigate the pre-conceptual condition of all comprehension.
When dealing with this topic, Palmer inevitably connects methodological
reason with modernity, and in particular with the Enlightenment:
If it is not possible to have comprehension without assumptions, if, in other words,
the thing which we call “reason” is a philosophical construction and not a court of
last resort, then we have to reexamine the relation we have with our heritage. The
tradition and the authority do not need to be seen as enemies of reason and rational
freedom, as they were in the Enlightenment, in the Romantic period and in our time.
Tradition provides a flow of conceptions in the interior of which we place ourselves,
and we should be prepared to distinguish among assumptions that are fruitful and
others which imprison us and prevent us from thinking and seeing.11

The pretensions of reason and the unavoidability of tradition are not intrinsically opposed, because reason is always within tradition. All comprehension
is defined historically. And the historicity of all comprehension is a consequence of the originary condition of the human person as a “being-in-theworld.” For this reason, comprehension is always rooted. As being-in-theworld, the human person is always bound to tradition. There is no way of
renouncing this condition, since it is this condition that enables the subject to
10 RICHARD PALMER, HERMENÊUTICA [HERMENEUTICS] 170 (Maria Luı́sa Ribeiro Ferreira
trans., Edições 70 1997) (1969).
11 Id. at 186-87.
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understand. The historicity of the human person is the condition of possibility
of all comprehension: The human person understands through her pre-concepts—pre-judgments—that are the products of history. This situation of historicity is the “transcendental condition” of all human comprehension.
Therefore, tradition is not at our disposal, as a “given” object, that can be
manipulated by the will of the subject. On the contrary, the human person
originally finds herself in a situation of subjection.
All comprehension takes place within the horizon of a tradition of meaning. This tradition leaves its mark and makes comprehension possible. Thus, a
text, be it biblical, scientific, poetic, philosophical or legal should be understood in the hermeneutic situation in which it is inserted, that is, in relation to
the present. Likewise, knowledge, values, decisions, interpretations and actions
have tradition as a reference, and they condition consciousness itself. It is in
this sense that pre-judgments integrate the structure of all comprehension.
They can never be eliminated, even though this is the intent of a vigilant critical
reason. Pre-judgments are not only preset in the consciousness of the subject,
they are part of its foundation.
Regarding the matter of critical and hermeneutic reason referred to previously, the debate between Gadamer and Habermas is important. On one hand,
Gadamer insists that the historicity of interpretation as a factor that may not be
eliminated from the human condition does not reduce comprehension; it
enables and enriches comprehension, giving it the condition of human
comprehension.
Habermas, on the other hand, understands that the inevitable character of
historicity restricts knowledge. Gadamer’s intention is to overcome the philosophy of subjectivity. The fantasy that reflection can do almost anything—a
trademark of the philosophy of modern consciousness—is overthrown by the
phenomenological structure of reality that does not allow a separation between
subject and object. This prevents the intended existence of a subject originally
and epistemically conceived as reflective consciousness. Reflection is always
guided by pre-understandings; they are a condition of the possibility of all comprehension. From this perspective it makes sense to say that the transcendental
condition of possibility of understanding is not a Platonic form or an a priori
category (Plato), the autonomy of will (Kant), the ideal or transcendental “communication community” (Habermas and Apel, respectively), the “originary
position” (Rawls), or the autopoeisis of self-referential systems (Luhmann). It
is, instead, historicity, the finitude and temporality of all being.
Gadamer elaborates the pre-structure of comprehension as a prejudice or
pre-judgment in the following way: “Actually ‘prejudice’ means a judgment
that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been
finally examined. . . . Thus ‘prejudice’ certainly does not necessarily mean a
false judgment, but part of the idea is that it can have either a positive or a
negative value.”12
According to a modern definition, the mediation of the prejudice that connects the subject with the thing to be understood has a more cognitive-epistemological character, and so was seen as a false judgment and therefore as
12

GADAMER, TRUTH, supra note 5, at 273; GADAMER, VERDADE, supra note 5, at 407.
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something negative. Here, however, Gadamer investigates the positive dimensions of the concept.
D. Beyond Subjectivity: Language and Being
Contemporary accounts of language move beyond subjectivity just as contemporary accounts of understanding move beyond method. Gadamer contends
that Heidegger’s emergence in the German academic philosophical scene was
profoundly linked to the fundamental experience of language as treated by him
in a philosophical manner. Initially, the impact occurred in the German language. Later, it extended to the whole world. Gadamer asserts that he saw the
proximity of language with philosophy as he heard the voice and unique intuitive strength of Heidegger’s language.13 The return to the beginning of philosophy promoted the recollection of certain themes and problems of Greek
philosophy, such as the battle between rhetoric and philosophy, the assertion of
logos as central to finding truth, and the shift of Platonic Socrates in relation to
the Attic philosophy; in Aristotle this is even clearer, when logos is used in
logic due to its capacity of showing itself as a conceptual enunciation, as an
apophansis.14 Later, Heidegger directed his own language to this beginning of
philosophy, which is determinant.15
The arrival of Heidegger in Marburg represented a new era for philosophy.
The Heideggerian language and the terminology used were always elaborated
due to new conceptual boldness in the elaboration of Heidegger’s categories.
Language, terminology and concepts—that is, Heideggerian philosophy—constantly confronted the neo-Kantism, which was the contemporary philosophy of
the day. This was the context that impressed Gadamer in Marburg. The concept of life that had an unmistakable mark left by Heidegger in Freiburg
demanded, in Marburg, the challenge of a new clarification. Gadamer explains
how this was expressed in the uncommon and vigorous language of Heidegger.
Heidegger’s constant effort was toward the new through the extraordinary
strength of language. How would one accomplish this task? Heidegger’s
answer was destruction (Destruktion).
I always see myself with the task of clarifying an incomprehension that has been
widely spread, which was induced by the European languages and was concomitantly
blamed for the cold welcome to Heidegger in the world: according to the linguistic
feeling of those years, “destruction” did not mean “decimation” at all, it meant a
deconstruction with a safe goal: a deconstruction of the sedimented layers that, in the
past, just as in the present, does not match with the language that is really spoken.
What was at play, in other words, was the task of taking ownership or deconstructing
the conceptual language of all the history of thought which leads us to the thought of
the Greek, passing by the Latin in the Ancient World and Christian Middle Age, and
by the survival of this conceptuality, until the development of modern thought and its
national languages. Therefore, the matter of attention was to deal with the traditional
terminology in a deconstructive manner aiming at reconducting it to originating
experiences.16
13
14
15
16

GADAMER, RETROSPECT 1, supra note 8, at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 29-30.
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In this case, what was at play was to talk as if wanting to show something,
and to avoid the stale, conceptual language inherited by tradition. The direction
of the eye must show something. To understand this is to understand the
phatos of phenomenology. According to Gadamer:
Thus, the formal indication goes back to experiences of the thought relative to the
world of life that is sedimented in language, which originally also resided on the
basis of the conceptuality of tradition and that the Greek thought had developed. The
Greek Ancient world, the Latin Middle Age and modernity return to this conceptuality in its conceptual formation. Thus, it is not a matter of a return to the philosophy
of Aristotle, but of a crossing through him.17

Heidegger was familiar with Aristotle, since he had studied theology.
However, the Aristotle he knew was one interpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas.
Later, he read the Greek philosopher with a new inner motivation and discovered a new Aristotle. Through the reading of the Rhetoric, Heidegger became
attuned to the existential significance of the doctrine of affect. However, something important for Heidegger had been lost; he, the one “who knew what
anguish was—anguish in relation to life, to death and to the voice of conscience.”18 This was the first access to Aristotle, in and through the boldness of
the new language. Yet, in Being and Time, Heidegger commends the analytical-existential meaning of language, as Gadamer highlights.19
Gadamer is sensitive to the strength of Heideggerian language, and this is
the starting point of his thesis about language. As Gadamer reveals the new
direction of the Heideggerian reflections, he announces how his own philosophical path will be guided by the theme of language:
After abandoning the transcendental self-conception in which the Being and Time
had focused on, Heidegger also abandons more fundamentally the dimension of subjectivity and even discards, after the “turn,” the being-there’s structure of care from
his experiences of thoughts, as well as the concept of comprehension and hermeneutic. It was in this pathway that my works were carried out and oriented by the theme
of language and the primacy of dialog and initially outlined, which had as a reference
the draft of the problem proposed on the third part of Truth and Method. Those who
think about the ‘language’ move beyond subjectivity.”20

Thus, when this direction is defined, Gadamer highlights the lively character of language and human participation in language. He is not concerned with
language in its instrumental sense because the human experience does not have
a pre-linguistic character, or a non-linguistic nature. Experience, thinking and
comprehension are thoroughly linguistic activities. When using words to designate something, we formulate a statement that already belongs to a linguistic
situation. In this manner, his thesis eliminates the possibility of metaphysics
because the finiteness and linguisticality of every being precludes us from finding the desired methodological foundation of all historical science.
17

Id.
Id. at 31.
19 Id. at 43.
20 2
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HERMENÊUTICA EM RETROSPECTIVA: A VIRADA
HERMENÊUTICA [HERMENEUTICS IN RETROSPECT: THE HERMENEUTIC TURN] 27 (Marco
Antônio Casanova trans., 2d ed. Petrópolis 2007) (1995) [hereinafter GADAMER, RETROSPECT 2].
18
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LINGUISTICALITY provides the common ground on which we find ourselves and on which we stand. As Palmer defines it when analyzing the theme
in Gadamer:
Language is reservoir and a communicating medium of the tradition: tradition hides
itself and language is a medium. Experience is not so much something that comes
prior to language, but rather experience itself occurs in and through language.
Linguisticality is something that permeates the way of being-in-the-world of historical man. As we have observed, man has “world” and lives in a world due to
language.21

This new understanding prevents us from uncovering an UNSHAKEABLE
is no possibility of requiring a criterion for an
absolute truth. Metaphysics—as first knowledge, fundamental, foundational
and self-founded—becomes illusory, and gives way to a hermeneutic ontology
of historical experience and the interpretation of that experience.22 The experience of linguisticality results in the ontological shift of hermeneutics guided by
language (which is the title of Part III of Gadamer’s Truth and Method). After
all, the being that can be understood is language,23 which is why language
works as a medium of hermeneutical experience. It is through language that
interlocutors understand each other regarding the matter at issue. There is no
other way. All understanding occurs within the language.
That is why the hermeneutical problem is presented as a special case of
the RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THINKING AND LANGUAGE. We are facing an original evidence. As real language, it cannot be separated from what it says, from
what is said, and for what it is said. In this sense, language is sharing, participation, opportunity of being part of and taking part in.24 Language is part of
life, always in the context of tradition. Gadamer uses the term “linguistic tradition,” which means that tradition is essentially language, and transmission of
something occurs through its medium: Something is transmitted in historicity,
in tradition. It is in language that THE WORLD AND I occur in their original
unity. Gadamer concludes that:
AND STABLE FOUNDATION—there

When we talk to each other, when we seek words to engage each other and ourselves,
when we experience the words that lead to a common language and form such a
language, we strive to understand ourselves—and that always means: the whole,
world and man; however it is possible that we do not really understand each other.25

In this concept of originary language, language ceases to be merely instrumental. Language is not a third thing that stands between a pre-defined subject
and an object that stands independently.

21

PALMER, supra note 10, at 210.
MANFREDO ARAÚJO DE OLIVEIRA, REVIRAVOLTA LINGÜÍSTICO-PRAGMÁTICA NA
FILOSOFIA CONTEMPORÂNEA [LINGUISTIC–PRAGMATIC SHIFT IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY] 232 (1996).
23 GADAMER, TRUTH, supra note 5, at 470; GADAMER, VERDADE, supra note 5, at 687.
24 GADAMER, RETROSPECT 2, supra note 20, at 38.
25 Id.
22
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E. Legal Hermeneutics
1. The Significance of Application
The theme of application is central to a general understanding of hermeneutics, as well as to the special situation of legal hermeneutics. Gadamer
seeks to recover the fundamental hermeneutical problem. In TRADITIONAL HERMENEUTICS, the problem was divided into three parts: first, understanding—
subtilité intelligendi; second, interpretation—subtilité explicandi; and third,
application—subtilité aplicandi. These three moments together characterized
the realization of understanding, as a know-how that requires a particular
refinement of spirit—a subtilité.26
The hermeneutical problem formulated in TRADITIONAL HERMENEUTICS
FIRST UNDERWENT A change in the Romantic period, which recognized the
internal unity of understanding and interpreting. Understanding and interpreting are not separate acts, nor separate moments. Understanding is always an
interpretation. Gadamer writes: “Interpretation is not an occasional, post facto
supplement to understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation,
and hence interpretation is the explicit form of understanding.”27
Although there was a breakthrough in the fusion of these two moments,
they still remained completely disconnected from the third moment of the hermeneutical process, the moment of application. As an example, Gadamer states
that there is a different understanding from Sacred Scriptures in the Christian
preaching and the historical and theological understanding. Following the
Gadamerian considerations, understanding always involves the application of
the text that you want to understand, and the interpreter’s current situation.28
Based on these requirements, Gadamer undertook a further step toward
unifying the process of including the moment of application in the process of
interpretation. He goes beyond romantic hermeneutics in order to affirm the
unitary process, not only of understanding and interpretation, but also of application. Application is now a constituent moment in a unified process, no less
than the other two other moments. He recovers the forgotten history of hermeneutics in order to show that the logical and natural task of hermeneutics was to
adapt the text to a specific situation to which it referred. This would be the
original model, as the interpreter of the Divine Will was the one who knew how
to interpret the language of the oracles. Likewise, today it is the interpreter’s
task not only to reproduce what the interlocutor says to those who must clarify
the intended meaning, but also to opine on the situation by being knowledgeable about the language of both parts.29
Gadamer argues that the close bond that united philological, juridical and
theological hermeneutics in their origin rests on the recognition that application
is an integral moment of all understanding.30 And in this line of thought, the
tension between the text and its application is a constitutive tension. In the case
of the theological hermeneutics, the constitutive tension occurs between the
26
27
28
29
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revealed text and the meaning through the application of the preaching interpreter. In legal interpretation the constitutive tension occurs between the text
of law—normative text—and the scope of its application by the interpreter at
the moment of decision—the decision of the court, for example. This means
that application is a constitutive moment of understanding and not merely a
possible effect of it. That is why a text, whether a law or a message of salvation, must always be understood at each moment and in each concrete situation,
and consequently, with a new and distinct mode based on the assumption that
“understanding is always applying.” Somehow, application as a hermeneutic
categorical moment is presented in advance. There is, therefore, a categorical
anteriority of application.
For Gadamer, legal and theological hermeneutics are the real models of
this thesis. What interests us here is the model of legal hermeneutics.
2. The Idea of Practical Philosophy and the Significance of
Aristotelian Hermeneutics
The idea of practical philosophy was developed by Aristotle in response to
Plato’s mathematical theology of the good. The subject is presented by
Gadamer with the following distinctions:
Nevertheless, the practical philosophy has its metaphysics. The metaphysical distinction of man the logos, to be able to choose, and to have the need to choose. Therefore, having the need to know or find “the good”—each time in a concrete situation.
The Aristotelian term for this is: the man—as a free citizen—has prohairesis.
However, Aristotle distinguishes two forms in which such a knowledge of good finds
its perfection, techne and phronesis, forms that rest on the difference between poiesis
and praxis. The distinction of poiesis and praxis belongs to the content of Practical
Philosophy, in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics.31

We know the distinctions that Aristotle makes. He separated theoretical
philosophy from practical philosophy (and poetical). Man is “logos”—he is
his knowledge and his thinking—but also praxis—action directed toward an
end. For him it is praxis instead of poiesis, it is phronesis instead of techne.
Besides the importance of categorical distinctions when dealing with practical
philosophy, practical philosophy also deserves attention in the sixth book of the
Nicomachean Ethics. The relationship between theoretical and practical rationality, between sophia and phronesis, is the relationship of mutual conditionality.32 There is no theoretical person who ignores practice, or a practical person
who is not attentive to theory. If Gadamer separated theoretical philosophy
from practical philosophy, it is also true that his practical philosophy opened up
new theoretical perspectives to which we should pay attention.33 To develop
these new perspectives, Gadamer employs a new interpretation of Aristotle for
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: practical philosophy as hermeneutics.
GADAMER’S NOTION OF APPLICATION has its origin in Aristotle, particularly in his Ethics. However, Aristotle’s treatment of application does not have
31

3 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, HERMENÊUTICA EM RETROSPECTIVA: HERMENÊUTICA E A
FILOSOFIA PRÁTICA [HERMENEUTICS IN RETROSPECT: HERMENEUTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE] 27-28 (Marco Antônio Casanova trans., 2d ed., Petrópolis 2007) (1995).
32 Id. at 30.
33 Id. at 34.
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the dimension, nor the drama, of the contemporary hermeneutical problem as it
is proposed by Gadamer. Aristotle focuses on ethical reasoning, namely the
tension between the general and the particular in moral thinking. Gadamer
teaches that the tension between the general and particular is also a key aspect
of hermeneutics. Gadamer says that, “UNDERSTANDING, THEN, IS A SPECIAL
34
CASE of applying something universal to a particular situation.”
This is the
Aristotelian problem with which hermeneutics is concerned. Hermeneutic philosophy is interested in the Aristotelian concept of practical-ethical rationality
because it was Aristotle who recognized that ethics was autonomous of metaphysics. In other words, Aristotle gave a different treatment to the practical
issues of knowledge as opposed to the immutable principles of things—theoretical knowledge. Practical activities in the face of uncertainty require practical
reason. Gadamer shifts the focus from ethics to hermeneutics. Gadamer advocates an Aristotelian reading of hermeneutics: that hermeneutic knowledge has
its own being, that it is not cognitive knowledge, nor epistemic, much less pure
reason.
Following his line of thought, Gadamer’s hermeneutic rationality, conceived by reviving and updating Aristotelian practical reason, leads him to
review the virtue of prudence (phronesis), which is extremely significant to
legal hermeneutics. According to Heidegger, practical reason as a display of
Aristotelian phronesis was the eye of the soul.35 Here, it is important to review
the distinction between techne and phronesis: The former is knowledge that
leads to the production of something; the latter is knowledge that guides the
political and social person to act. This distinction was also formulated by Aristotle. Craft, Art or techne can be learned as well as FORGOTTEN. Phronesis, on
the other hand, is moral knowledge. Once learned, it cannot be forgotten
because it has become part of the person acting.36
If the cultivation of justice is itself a task that requires knowledge and
power, Gadamer asks whether it is a techne.37 Is it not the application of the
fixed law to the concrete case? But then, why does Aristotle call legal practice
a form of phronesis rather than a techne?
Practical wisdom, or prudence, is indispensable to legal actors, especially
judges, because their situation is very different from the task of the craftsman
who stands before the object that he will produce. In the case of the application
of law, answering his own questions, Gadamer tells us:
In a certain instance he will have to refrain from applying the full rigor of the law.
But if he does, it is not because he has no alternative, but because to do otherwise
would not be right. In restraining the law, he is not diminishing it but, on the contrary, finding the better law.38

Aristotle names it equity, a corrective of legal justice. Therefore, it is not
an arbitrary concession. Concessions of the law should aim at achieving the
best law, instead of rejecting aspects of justice. Thus, in Gadamerian hermeneutic rationality the subject of understanding is implied in the process of
34
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implementation of law, because the application is no longer an effect, the end,
or possible understanding, but the determinant factor since the beginning, and
as a whole.
Although Gadamer unfolds in his thinking some more elements and categories that allow the distinction between technical knowledge (techne) and
moral knowledge (phronesis)—such as the relationship between the means and
ends of each, and the relationship between phronesis and understanding, issues
which are not developed here—the conclusion suggested by Gadamer is that
the Aristotelian analysis is a kind of model of problems inherent in the hermeneutical task.39 Thus we can conclude that Gadamer’s approach to legal hermeneutics describes a problem that cannot be ignored by the theory of law,
because we have been facing the shift from epistemology to hermeneutics. As
such, he is at the center of the critique of modernity. This shift has produced a
vigorous critique that has not yet been fully realized in juridical practice.
3. The Exemplary Status of Legal Hermeneutics
At the end of Chapter 10 in Truth and Method, entitled Recovery of the
Fundamental Hermeneutical Problem, Gadamer considers the very meaning of
legal hermeneutics, which he regards as emblematic. For Gadamer, legal hermeneutics is exemplary regarding the fundamental hermeneutical problem.
Thus, apart from any other hermeneutics, it plays a paradigmatic role for the
interpretation of hermeneutical phenomenon, as a unique process of understanding, interpretation and application. Legal hermeneutics has this status
because the jurist always aims at an application. The jurist takes the meaning
of the normative text—the law—and goes beyond the traditionary understanding to meet the needs of a particular case.40 The understanding of the text is
subjected to the resolution of the given case. Even if the lawyer has to think in
historical terms, the historical understanding in his case is not an end but a
means. Thus, the legal text and its application are in a constitutive tension,
making the knowledge of the meaning of a text and its application to a specific
legal case part of a unitary process, and as such they are inseparable. The legal
text, a law for example, is understood by the jurist from a determined given
case, whether real or fictitious. The normative content of the legal text is determined—in the sense that it is made, created, or produced—by taking into consideration the specific case to which it will be applied.
At first glance, legal reasoning might appear to be a specific rationality not
readily extended to other fields of inquiry. Legal texts are merely auxiliary aids
of legal practice; as a result, they would not aim to understand the tradition, the
most important characteristic of Gadamerian hermeneutics. However, this is
not Gadamer’s conclusion. As already noted, it is historical knowledge that is
essential for the original meaning of the text in question. Both aspects—historical meaning and application—make legal hermeneutics embody the authentic
historical hermeneutic procedure: the relationship between past and present,
between tradition and awareness of tradition. Thus, the legal tradition comes to
the present mediated through the application of texts to a concrete case. Conse39
40
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quently, the task of legal interpretation is not a special case of understanding,
but paradigmatic of the phenomenon of understanding in general. In
Gadamer’s words: “In reality then, legal hermeneutics is no special case but is,
on the contrary, capable of restoring the hermeneutical problem to its full
breadth and so re-establishing the former unity of hermeneutics, in which jurist
and theologian meet the philologist.”41
Although Gadamer has dedicated himself to exploring theological and historical hermeneutics, as well as the historian from this point on, he concludes
his discussion of the recovery of the fundamental hermeneutical problem by
making explicit reference to the paradigmatic significance of the legal hermeneutics. He notes that the model of legal hermeneutics has proved to be fruitful.
When the judge is authorized to make law by fulfilling the judicial function,
what he does is what takes place in any process of understanding.
In conclusion, every act of understanding includes application. The concept of practical rationality as hermeneutical rationality includes application as
part of the moment of understanding. Moreover, the essential relationship that
exists between legal hermeneutics and dogmatic juridical hermeneutics
assumes a predominant position. Otherwise, we must conceive that the legal
decision will be obtained by the methodical procedure of subsuming the individual case under a pre-established rule, which is unsustainable.42
III. THE DECOLONIAL SHIFT—AN INDICATIVE OUTLINE
By giving prominence to practical philosophy conceived as hermeneutic
philosophy, Gadamer leads us to new perspectives. Among the new perspectives is a critical hermeneutic rationality, developed by hermeneutic theorists
from the South that could be termed postcolonial, or more precisely,
decolonial. For example, this new perspective has been described by Enrique
Dussel as a transmodern shift through the victims; Walter Mignolo describes it
as “de-colonial shift”;43 Anibal Quijano defines it as the coloniality of power;44
Boaventura de Sousa Santos as an “epistemological shift of the South”;45 César
A. Rodriguez Garavito as a turning from global North to South;46 or in my
41
42
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See generally Walter Mignolo, Introduction to FREYA SCHIWY & NELSON MALDONADO
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KNOWLEDGE] (2006).
44 See generally ANIBAL QUIJANO, COLONIALIDADE DO PODER, EUROCENTRISMO E AMÉRICA
LATINA [THE COLONIALITY OF POWER, EUROCENTRISM AND LATIN AMÉRICA] , in A COLONIALIDADE DO SABER: EUROCENTRISMO E CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS. PERSPECTIVAS LATINO-AMERICANAS [THE COLONIALITY OF KNOWLADGE: EUROCENTRISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCES. LATINAMERICAN PERSPECTIVES] (Edgardo Lander ed., 2005).
45 See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, RENOVAR A TEORIA CRÍTICA E
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THE SOCIAL EMANCIPATION] (2007).
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view, as a shift from negativity to positivity;47 among many other authors. It is
certain that many other characterizations are possible to describe the critique of
modernity, post-modernity and hyper-modernity.
Among the many possible alternatives, I would like to highlight the broad
perspective of critical and decolonial thinking,48 a perspective that has the historical praxis of irrational domination and oppression as its starting point, in
which negativities are the place for the world’s most dramatic semi-peripheral
and peripheral material (and formal) injustice until today. To provide a short
outline of this perspective, I will mention some theoretical presuppositions by
Walter Mignolo, in his intellectual, political project that he describes as a “decolonial shift” or “de-colonial thinking.”49 This thought is produced by considering various parallel and complementary semiotic forms of social movements
that move in the margins of the political, economic structure, in rupture with
the image of wholeness to which they remain attached. The premise is that this
detachment—this rupture from within the wholeness—that decolonial thought
promotes, helps promote confidence that other worlds are possible, and are
already under construction.50 In this sense the shift of a decolonial hermeneutic critique promotes understanding of the linguisticality in which and for
which we are—language as a condition of the possibility of being, and the
condition of what we know and for what we know—language as a condition of
the possibility of knowledge, and also the condition of what we can do and for
what we can do—language as a condition of possibility of power.
There are two aspects to consider here. First, regarding linguisticality,
Mignolo argues that we are unable to imagine and think beyond the categories
of Greek and Latin language, adapted by the six imperial languages of modernity and coloniality (Italian, Spanish and Portuguese during the Renaissance,
and English, French and German since the Enlightenment, including the United
States after World War II).51 These categories are historically situated linguistically, semantically defined by the cultural ethos, and ideologically demarcated
as COLONIAL, IMPERIAL LANGUAGES. Linguisticality imposes on and overtakes
indigenous languages—the original linguisticality of these peoples. Hence,
another linguisticality (the linguisticality of the other) is dominated, silenced,
invalidated, and finally denied. This is the dimension of negativity, which is
real. Mignolo illustrates this point by saying that any attempt to think through
categories originating within linguistic traditions such as the Bengali, Aymara,
Arabic, Russian, or Bambara, among others, is doomed to failure.52
The second aspect to consider concerns the historically constituted linguisticality, that is, the base—the raw material—of historical consciousness. This
DESDE ABAJO: EL DESARROLLLO, LOS MOVIMIENTOS SOCIALES Y LA RESISTENCIA DEL
TERCER MUNDO [INTERNATIONAL LAW SINCE THE SOUTH] (2005).
47 See generally CELSO LUIZ LUDWIG, PARA UMA FILOSOFIA JURÍDICA DA LIBERTAÇÃO:
PARADIGMAS DA FILOSOFIA, FILOSOFIA DA LIBERTAÇÃO E DIREITO ALTERNATIVO [TO A
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION: PARADIGMS OF PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION AND ALTERNATIVE LAW] (2006).
48 See Mignolo, supra note 43, at 9-20, 83-123.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 12.
51 Id. at 12-13.
52 Id. at 13.
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linguisticality has coloniality as its main determination. It is in essence a colonized linguisticality. There is a linguisticality produced by the logic of coloniality. And this logic of coloniality operates in three different spheres: the
coloniality of power (economic and political coloniality), the coloniality of
knowledge (epistemological, philosophical, scientific, in the relationship
between languages with knowledge), and the coloniality of being (subjectivity,
control of sexuality).53 Therefore, the linguisticality of the human being—
being, knowledge and power—is shaped deeply by the logic of coloniality.
And the decolonial shift consists of releasing coloniality, beginning with the
decolonization of knowledge, power and being. It arises from the colonial difference, and maybe, from the imperial difference. Mignolo indicates the direction of the colonial shift as thinking of the materiality of other places,
memories, and bodies.54 Thinking, in short, through what was denied by the
rhetoric of modernity and effectively eliminated by the logic of modernity. The
colonial shift is a global process for the formation of another paradigm,
thoughts of coexistence, relative thinking, marginal thinking, and finally, negative thinking. Thus, the decolonial thinking can ask the following questions:
What kind of understanding do we need? From whom? For what? And to
whom? These issues may lead to the initial steps towards the hermeneutics of
negativity, or decolonization.
Concerning the possibility of the decolonial critique, it is important to recognize the greatness of Gadamer’s critical work, which emphasizes the centrality of hermeneutics in the world today. From this it opens the doors to new
perspectives. For it seems possible to say that hermeneutics is not everything.
However, it is also true to say that hermeneutics is in everything. We are
always interpreting, even as I have just done by interpreting some aspects of the
ontological hermeneutic shift by Hans-Georg Gadamer and the shift of a possible decolonial hermeneutics.

53
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Id. at 15.
Id. at 21-22.

